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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20000982-CA
v.

Priority No. 2

JAMES W. BAGGETT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a conditional no contest plea to one count of attempted
forgery, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-6-501 (1999). This Court
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Does a defendant commit forgery when, without authorization of the maker,
defendant fills in his name as payee on a check that is otherwise complete?
Because defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, but only
the trial court's application of the law to those findings, this court reviews the trial court's
ultimate conclusions based on those findings for correctness, according no deference.
State v. Hubbard, 861 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing state v. Thurman,

846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
STATUTES
The following statutes are contained in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-109 (1997) (bearer or order instruments);
§ 70A-3-115 (1997) (incomplete instruments);
§ 76-6-501 (1999) (forgery).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State originally charged defendant with one count of forgery, a third degree
felony (R.l, 3). Following the denial of his motion to dismiss, defendant entered a
conditional no contest plea to a charge of attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor (R. 3
37-39, 54: 3-4). The trial court sentenced defendant to one year in the Utah County Jail,
fined defendant $500.00 with a $425.00 surcharge, and suspended the sentence and fine
pending this appeal (R. 42-43, 55:3). Defendant timely appealed (R. 45).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On 3 July 2000 Derryl Allen wrote a check for $110.00, signed his name, and left
the payee line blank (R. 1, 36). Mr. Allen then lost the check and immediately notified
his bank (R. 35-36). Defendant found the lost check, wrote his name on the payee line,
and uttered the check to a bank teller (R. 35). Defendant told the teller that "the victim
gave him the check as a payment" (id.). Defendant did not know Mr. Allen and he did

1

This statement is taken from the trial court's findings of fact enumerated in its
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 33-36).
2

not have Mr. Allen's authorization to write his name on the payee line (id.). Mr. Allen
did not give the check to defendant as a form of payment and defendant made no effort to
locate Mr. Allen or return the lost check (id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's argument that he did not commit forgery rests entirely on his assertion
that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to this criminal action. Because the
UCC does not apply, defendant's argument fails.
Even under the UCC, defendant committed forgery because he altered the check
by transforming it from a bearer instrument to an order instrument and also by completing
the incomplete instrument. Either action constitutes an "alteration" under the UCC.
Because defendant altered the check without Mr. Allen's authority, he is guilty of forgery
even under the UCC.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE UCC DOES NOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL
ACTIONS, DEFENDANT COMMITTED FORGERY WHEN
HE WROTE IN HIS NAME AS PAYEE ON THE CHECK AND
UTTERED THE ALTERED CHECK TO A BANK TELLER.

A person commits forgery if, "with purpose to defraud anyone . . . he: (a) alters
any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered writing; or (b). . .
completes,... any writing so that the writing or the . . . completion,.. . purports to be the
act of another . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-50l(l)(a) & (b) (1999).
Defendant argues that his actions did not amount to forgery because the UCC
applies to this criminal case. Br. of Appellant at 5-7. Defendant reasons that under the
3

UCC, an otherwise completed check that does not state a payee is payable to bearer. Id.
Therefore, defendant argues that he did not "alter" or "complete" the check when he
wrote in his name on the blank payee line, because the check was already payable to him
when he found it.2 Id. Thus, defendant's argument that he did not commit forgery
depends entirely on his contention that the UCC applies to this criminal case.
The UCC, however, does not apply to criminal cases. State v. Amoroso, 1999 Utah
Ct. App. 60, Iff 8, 17, 975 P.2d 505. In Amoroso, this Court reversed the trial court for
applying the UCC definition of "sale," rather than the definition provided in the Utah
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, in a prosecution for unlawfully importing into and
selling alcoholic products in Utah. See also, demons v. United States, 400 A.2d 1048,
1049-50 (D.C. 1979) (finding that on facts of this case, UCC definitions of "commercial
terms of art are irrelevant to the issue of appellant's criminal liability"); United States v.
Strangstalienf 7 M.J. 225, 247 n.78 (CM.A. 1979) (UCC definitions "not applicable in
criminal cases"); Thogerson v. State, 479 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Ga. App. 1996) ("definitions
contained in the UCC are inapplicable to a criminal prosecution"); Barcroft v. State, 881
S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. App. 1994) ("UCC is not applicable to criminal proceedings");
State v. Kuhn, 504 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Wis. App. 1993) (UCC definition of "bailee" is
"irrelevant to the meaning of the word as used in the criminal theft statute"); cf United
States v. Ravel 930 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1991) (UCC "may be relevant to the

2

Defendant does not argue that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit
forgery, that is, acting "with purpose to defraud anyone." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6501(1) (1999).
4

determination whether property is 'stolen' for purposes of interpreting a federal criminal
statute"); but see Freeman v. State, 292 S.E.2d 563, 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (referring,
without analysis, to UCC definition of "sale" to demonstrate that a sale was completed in
a prosecution for sale of marijuana).
Because the UCC does not apply, defendant's argument fails. Defendant "altered"
the check without Mr. Allen's permission when he wrote in his name as payee on the lost
check (R. 35). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-50l(l)(a) (1999). He also "uttered" the
altered check when he presented it to the bank teller (R. 35). See id. Additionally, he
"completed" the check, and purported the completion to be the act of another, when he
wrote in his name on the blank payee line and told the bank teller that Mr. Allen gave him
the check as a payment (R. 35). See id. § 76-6-501 (l)(b) (1999). In fact, at oral argument
on defendant's motion to dismiss, his counsel conceded that "I think it's a given that he
completed [the check]" (R. 56: 3,4). Any one of these acts constitutes forgery. See
People v. Pool, 522 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (holding that under the
Colorado forgery statute, defendant altered a money order when, without authority, he
filled in his own name as payee and endorsed it).3
State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah 1963), upon which defendant relies, is
distinguishable. In Donaldson, the defendant urged the court to reverse his conviction for

3

Colorado's forgery statute, as explained in Pool, is similar to Utah's forgery
statute. Both define forgery to include an alteration of an instrument without authority,
done with an intent to defraud. Compare, Pool, 522 P.2d at 103-04 with UTAH CODE
ANN. §76-6-501 (1999).
5

issuing a check against insufficient funds. 385 P.2d at 151. He argued that the
instrument he issued was a "bill of exchange," rather than a "check, draft or order for the
payment of money upon a bank" because he had not filled in the name of a payee on the
check. Id, The Utah Supreme Court held that the instrument was indeed a check, even
though it did not state the name of a payee. Id. at 151-52. The court observed that the
omission of a payee on an otherwise completed check does not affect its negotiability, but
allows any bona fide holder to fill in the payee blank and is payable to the bearer until a
particular payee is named. Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that when the
defendant tendered the otherwise complete instrument as payment for gasoline, he had
issued a "check," and had authorized any bona fide holder to fill in the payee blank. Id. at
152 (emphasis added). Donaldson did not analyze or even mention the forgery statute.
In this case, Mr. Allen never tendered the check to anyone, rather he lost it (R. 3536). Defendant knew that the check was lost and that he was not a bona fide holder (R.
35). Indeed, he lied about the nature of the check when he uttered it to the bank teller for
cashing (id.). Thus, Donaldson is distinguishable because defendant never tendered the
check to defendant and defendant was never a bona fide holder.
II.

EVEN IF THE UCC APPLIED, DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF
FORGERY BECAUSE HE ALTERED THE CHECK BOTH
BY TRANSFORMING IT FROM A BEARER INSTRUMENT
TO AN ORDER INSTRUMENT AND BY COMPLETING IT.

Even if the UCC applied to this case, defendant is guilty of forgery because he
altered a writing of another without his authority. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(l)(a)
(1999). Defendant's actions amount to an "alteration" of the check under either of two
6

provisions of the UCC, the first dealing with bearer and order instruments, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70A-3-109 (1997), and the second dealing with the completion of an incomplete
instrument, see id. at § 70A-3-115 (1997).
First, defendant "altered" the check by transforming it from a bearer instrument to
an order instrument. Under the UCC, a "bearer instrument" includes a promise or order
that does not state a payee. "A promise or order is payable to bearer if it: .. . (b) does not
state a payee." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109(l)(b) (1997). Conversely, an "order
instrument" is an instrument payable to the order of an identified person. "A promise or
order that is not payable to bearer is payable to order if it is payable to the order of an
identified person, or to an identified person or order. A promise or order that is payable
to order is payable to the identified person." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109(2) (1997).
Bearer and order instruments are distinct and have different negotiability
requirements. "If the instrument is payable to bearer, it can be negotiated by delivery
alone. If it is payable to the order of an identified person it cannot be negotiated without
the indorsement of that person." 2 Frederick M. Hart & William F. Willier, Negotiable
Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1C.12[1], at 1C-27 (2001) (footnote
omitted). An instrument cannot be both a bearer and an order instrument; the concepts
are mutually exclusive. "Since the definition of an order instrument excludes instruments
that are payable to bearer, if an instrument is payable to bearer it cannot be payable to
order." Id. at § 1C.12[5], at 1C-32.

7

Defendant altered the check when he wrote his name on the blank payee line. As
defendant contends, when he found the check it was payable to bearer under the UCC
because it did not state a payee but was otherwise complete. See UTAH CODE ANN. §
70A-3-109(l)(b) (1997). When he wrote in his name as payee, (R. 35), defendant
"altered" the check by transforming it from a bearer instrument to an order instrument.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109(2) (1997). See also, State v. Smith, 622 P.2d 1052,
1052-53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that defendant altered a writing when he added a
payee to a blank payee line on an otherwise completed check and thus transformed the
check from a bearer instrument to an order instrument); State v. Herrera, 18 P.3d 326,
329-30 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that defendant did not alter a writing where he did
not transform the writing from a bearer to an order instrument). Defendant did not have
Mr. Allen's authorization to alter the check (R. 35). Thus, defendant is guilty of forgery
even if the UCC applied. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-50 l(l)(a) (1999).
Defendant also "altered" the check under a second provision of the UCC because
he completed an incomplete instrument. The UCC states that an "'[incomplete
instrument' means a signed writing, whether or not issued by the signer, the contents of
which show at the time of signing that it is incomplete but that the signer intended it to be
completed by the addition of words or numbers." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-115(1)
(1997). A jury could reasonably infer, based on common experience, that when Mr. Allen
signed the check, filled in an amount, and left the payee line blank, (R. 36), that he later

8

intended to complete the check by designating a payee. Thus, the lost check was an
"incomplete instrument" under the UCC. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-115(1) (1997).
Defendant "altered" the "incomplete instrument" when he added his name to the
blank payee line without Mr. Allen's permission (R. 35). "If words or numbers are added
to an incomplete instrument without authority of the signer, there is an alteration of the
incomplete instrument under Section 70A-3-407."4 Id. at § 70A-3-115(3). See also 2
Hart & Willier, § 1C.12[5], at 1C-33 (stating that if a blank payee line is filled in without
the authorization of the drawer the instrument becomes "an alteration of an incomplete
instrument."). Thus, defendant is guilty of forgery under this section of the UCC as well
because in completing the incomplete instrument, he "altered" the check without Mr.
Allen's authorization. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (l)(a) (1999).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this ID

day of June, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General

4

Section 70A-3-407 states that "'[alteration' means an unauthorized change in an
instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party, or an
unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument
relating to the obligation of a party." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-407 (1997).
9
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Addendum A

76-6-501- Forgery — "Writing* defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniae
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.

70A-3-109. Payable to bearer or to order.
( D A promise or order is payable to bearer if it:
(a) states that it is payable to bearer or to the order of bearer or
otherwise indicates that the person in possession of the promise or order
is entitled to payment;
(b) does not state a payee; or
(c) states that it is payable to or to the order of cash or otherwise
indicates that it is not payable to an identified person.
(2) A promise or order that is not payable to bearer is payable to order if it
is payable to the order of an identified person, or to an identified person or
order. A promise or order that is payable to order is payable to the identified
person.
(3) An instrument payable to bearer may become payable to an identified
person if it is specially indorsed pursuant to Subsection 70A-3-205Q). An
instrument payable to an identified person may become payable to bearer if it
is indorsed in blank pursuant to Subsection 70A-3-205(2).

70A-3-115. Incomplete instrument.
(1) "Incomplete instrument" means a signed writing, whether or not issued
by the signer, the contents of which show at the time of signing that it is
incomplete but that the signer intended it to be completed by the addition of
words or numbers.
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), if an incomplete instrument is an instrument
under Section 70A-3-104, it may be enforced according to its terms if it is not
completed, or according to its terms as augmented by completion. If an
incomplete instrument is not an instrument under Section 70A-3-104, but,
after completion, the requirements of Section 70A-3-104 are met, the instrument may be enforced according to its terms as augmented by completion.
(3) If words or numbers are added to an incomplete instrument without
authority of the signer, there is an alteration of the incomplete instrument
under Section 70A-3-407.
(4) The burden of establishing that words or numbers were added to an
incomplete instrument without authority of the signer is on the person
asserting the lack of authority.

